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Leadership and Voting: 
The Connection at the State Level 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
While it is now well established that Australian party leaders at the national level 
influence political choice in federal elections, little systematic study of the equivalent 
role that state premiers and opposition leaders might play has been undertaken. In the 
2001 Australian Election Study (n=2010), questions were asked of a national 
probability sample of voters about respondent feelings towards their state premier and 
state opposition leader, in addition to equivalent questions about John Howard, Kim 
Beazley and other major political figures in federal politics. The data generated by 
this survey thus provide an opportunity to investigate the impact that contemporary 
state political leaders have on electoral choice. The analysis produces mixed results, 
but the findings show that state leaders generally do have an impact on voting 
behaviour in state elections, although in some cases this influence is eliminated when 
account is taken of voter attitudes towards the federal leaders. The analysis also 
affords an opportunity to test the extent of crossover between state and federal 
politics, in terms of how much state leaders influence federal voting and vice versa. 
While the results are somewhat uneven, they do indicate that some state leaders 
influence federal voting and that the federal leaders do influence voting in some 
states. 
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Introduction 
Writing over forty years ago in the preface to his edited work about state government 
and politics in Australia, Rufus Davis commented that ‘So much more needs to be 
known’ about, among other things, ‘the political behaviour of the voter who 
consistently divides his [sic] party loyalty between Federal and State elections’ (Davis 
1960, x). In the early years of the twenty-first century it has to be said that, while 
those forty-odd years have seen great advances in our knowledge about political 
behaviour at the national level in Australia, there remains precious little significant 
research on the subject at the level of state politics. Notwithstanding the promise in 
the early work of Colin Hughes (1969) and the numerous general studies of state 
elections, the focus in Australia when it comes to in depth electoral behaviour 
research remains very much on federal politics.  
 This paper attempts to contribute to the filling of this void in the study of 
political behaviour in Australian state elections by using data from a nationwide 
sample survey containing some state-level variables. The paper focuses on voter 
attitudes towards the political party leaders in each state and on the impact these 
attitudes have on individual voting decisions in state (and federal) elections. Starting 
from the position that leadership effects on voting behaviour are now fairly well 
established as a feature of national elections in many countries, including Australia 
(for example, Graetz and McAllister 1987; Bean and Kelley 1988; Bean and Mughan 
1989; Bean 1993; McAllister 1996), the analysis investigates whether this notion of 
leadership effects also applies in state politics. While modest in their size, leadership 
effects have been shown to be consistently significant in federal politics – regularly 
accounting for at least 1 or 2% of the overall vote and on some occasions as much as 
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4% or more – and there is little reason to assume that this phenomenon would not 
translate into the state political domain.  
 For one thing, as much if not more than at the national level, politics in the 
Australian states has been studded with political leaders whose individual 
personalities and political styles have dominated the politics of a particular era –
premiers such as Don Dunstan, Neville Wran and Joh Bjelke-Petersen, to name but a 
few. Their prominence is reflected, among other ways, in the titles of books such as 
The Dunstan Decade, The Wran Model and The Bjelke-Petersen Premiership (Parkin 
and Patience 1981; Chaples, Nelson and Turner 1985; Patience 1985). However, 
while these and other writings have clearly alluded to a powerful role for state 
premiers in the electoral success of their parties, the analyses tend to be speculative in 
nature and lacking in a foundation of direct empirical evidence. Some authors have 
made more explicit claims about the electoral influence of particular party leaders in 
particular state elections (for example, Bennett 2001; Williams 2001a; 2001b), but the 
evidential basis for these claims remains relatively thin and still largely indirect.  
The analysis in this paper brings direct empirical data to bear on the question 
of leadership effects in contemporary Australian state politics, in the form of results 
from survey research, which allow a number of straightforward hypotheses to be 
tested. The foregoing discussion suggests, for example, that, in addition to the well 
established finding that federal party leaders influence voting behaviour in federal 
elections, we might expect to find that state party leaders would influence voting 
decisions in state elections. Some of the literature also points to the possibility of 
crossover effects whereby, within the appropriate jurisdiction, state party leaders may 
influence voting in federal elections and conversely federal leaders may influence 
voting in state elections.  
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For example, David Charnock (2001) has argued that state influences on 
federal voting tend to result ‘from responses to state governments and political 
leaders’, while Ian McAllister (2003) has shown that approval in opinion polls of 
prime ministers (and federal opposition leaders) is enhanced when state governments 
(or oppositions) are of the same party as the federal leader. Furthermore, Don Aitkin 
(1982b) has suggested that state political leaders are highly influential in shaping the 
vote in national-level constitutional referendums. More broadly, we should not find it 
too surprising that state and federal voting might be strongly intertwined in the minds 
of electors, given the close parallels in political form between the federal and state 
arenas and the extent of overlapping identification with political parties (Aitkin 
1982a) and also given the confusion that is sometimes evident over the roles and 
responsibilities of the different levels of government (Vromen 1995). Although the 
crossover hypothesis is usually stated in terms of state effects on federal politics 
(Holmes and Sharman 1977; Charnock 2001) – perhaps because federal influences on 
state politics are taken as given – it is just as likely if not more so to apply in the 
reverse direction as well.  
 This paper tests the hypotheses outlined above using data from the 2001 
Australian Election Study (AES), a national probability sample survey of 2010 voters 
conducted by mail immediately after the federal election held in November 2001 
(Bean, Gow and McAllister 2002). The Australian Electoral Commission supplied the 
systematic random sample drawn from the Commonwealth electoral rolls for every 
state and territory. The initial mailing was timed to reach the respondents on the 
Monday after the election and after several follow-up mailings the response rate to the 
survey was 55%. 
  4
Initial Results 
The first set of results comprises descriptive information about the political leaders 
who feature in the analysis, that is the premier and opposition leader in each state and 
the prime minister and federal leader of the opposition. The key independent variables 
in the analysis are attitudinal ratings of each of these leaders, derived from the 
following survey question: ‘Again using a scale from 0 to 10, please show how much 
you like or dislike the party leaders. Again, if you don’t know much about them, you 
should give them a rating of 5.’ The scale was labelled ‘Strongly dislike’ at 0, 
‘Neutral’ at 5 and ‘Strongly like’ at 10. At the head of the list of 10 political leaders 
whom respondents were asked to rate were Kim Beazley, the leader of the opposition 
Australian Labor Party at the federal election, and John Howard, the prime minister 
and leader of the Liberal Party. At the end of the list respondents were asked to rate 
‘Your state premier’ and ‘Your state opposition leader’.  
 Table 1 shows means and standard deviations for the ratings of these leaders, 
first at the national level, and then within each state where the subsample is large 
enough to allow for meaningful separate analysis. For the purposes of this analysis, 
the ‘national’ level refers to the five states which had a state Labor government in 
power at the time of the survey, that is New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, 
Western Australia and Tasmania. Thus, in addition to the two territories, South 
Australia is excluded because of the technical difficulty of including in the nationwide 
analysis a premier and opposition leader of opposite political affiliations to the 
remainder. Individual subsample analyses of South Australia are included, however, 
while the subsample from Tasmania of 59 was too small to subject to separate 
analysis.  
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 The first section of Table 1 shows the mean popularity within the national 
sample for the state premiers and state leaders of the opposition collectively and for 
the prime minister and federal opposition leader. The state premiers generally rate 
much higher than the opposition leaders (with an overall mean in the nationwide 
sample of 5.6 on the 0-10 scale, compared to 4.2), a result that is repeated in each 
individual state and which may partially reflect the greater opportunities that premiers 
have to generate positive publicity. The standard deviations show a wider range of 
responses to the premiers than to the opposition leaders, which is probably indicative 
of the premiers having higher public profiles and so fewer respondents give them the 
neutral rating of 5. Again, this differential is repeated in most individual states. On 
this basis, the federal leader of the opposition could be judged to have at least as high 
a profile as any state premier (the standard deviation for his rating being 2.8 compared 
to 2.7 for the premiers), while, not unexpectedly, the prime minister has a higher 
profile still. In terms of popularity, however, Beazley outscores Howard (5.8 versus 
5.6), as well as the state premiers as a group. It is also worth noting that the scores for 
Howard and Beazley, from this less than totally complete national sample, are very 
similar to those in the full AES sample (Bean and McAllister 2002).  
[Table 1 about here] 
 Turning now to leaders within the different states, we see that the New South 
Wales premier, Bob Carr, has a lower popularity rating than any other premier apart 
from South Australia’s Rob Kerin. The Liberal leader of the opposition in New South 
Wales, Kerry Chikarovski, scores well behind Carr but, at 4.2, her mean rating is at a 
similar level to all of the other opposition leaders. Ratings of the premiers, on the 
other hand, vary more widely. Although Carr, Kerin and premier of Western 
Australia, Geoff Gallop, all score at or just over the neutral point of 5, the Labor 
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premier in Victoria, Steve Bracks, has a mean rating of 5.9 and the Queensland 
premier, Peter Beattie, scores 6.3, making him the most popular major political figure 
in the country at the time of the survey. Interestingly, not only is Beattie the most 
popular premier, but the opposition leader in Queensland, Mike Horan of the National 
Party, is also the most popular – or least unpopular, to use a more accurate 
charaterisation – leader of the opposition.  
One problem for this study concerns the subsample sizes for the different 
states. The small subsamples of under 200 in Western Australia and South Australia, 
in particular, mean that the ensuing results that emerge from the analyses for these 
states, and to a lesser extent for Queensland, need to be viewed cautiously and as 
indicative rather than definitive. Notwithstanding this and other methodological issues 
discussed later, the analysis in this paper is arguably a useful first attempt to model 
the impact of state political leaders. 
Modelling the Electoral Influence of State Leaders 
Having provided descriptive background about the relative standing of the state and 
federal party leaders, we move now to a sustained analysis of the electoral impact of 
the leaders and a test of the hypotheses outlined earlier in the paper. Before 
embarking on the analysis we need first to discuss various methodological details, 
starting with a description of the dependent variables. Voting in state elections is 
measured by the question: ‘Which party did you vote for in the last state election?’ 
Federal voting is measured by the question: ‘In the Federal election for the House of 
Representatives on Saturday 10 November, which party did you vote for first in the 
House of Representatives?’  
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There is not a perfect correspondence between the state leaders at the time of 
the survey and those who led their respective parties into the previous state elections.1 
This, together with the fact that they are described in the survey questionnaire with 
generic labels rather than specific names, may serve to weaken the measured impact 
of state leaders in the analysis. However, given that there is a tendency among survey 
respondents to err towards their current preference when recalling past votes 
(Himmelweit, Jaeger Biberian and Stockdale 1978), this may not be as serious a 
problem as it might initially seem.  
Tables 2 to 5 report, first, the zero-order correlation between the leader rating 
and the vote and then results from both ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and 
logistic regression analyses. For the OLS analyses (and the correlations) the 
dependent variable includes all votes in the state or federal election, with votes for 
Labor scored 0, votes for the Liberal and National coalition parties scored 1 and votes 
for minor parties and independent candidates scored 0.5. For the logit analyses the 
dependent variable is restricted to votes for the two major party groups, with Labor 
scored 0 and Liberal-National scored 1. The OLS and logit analyses include controls 
for attitudinal scales measuring key political attitudes in Australia, that is attitudes 
towards trade unions and attitudes towards free enterprise (Kelley 1988), plus party 
identification. Preliminary analyses also included ten social structural variables (sex, 
age, education, occupation, employment sector, trade union membership, subjective 
class, religious denomination, church attendance and urban-rural residence), but their 
                                                 
1 In the five states that are subject to separate analysis, four of the ten leaders changed between the 
most recent state election and the post-federal election survey. Two others changed roles, from 
opposition leader to premier, while four retained their leadership and the same role. Only in New South 
Wales was there no change at all. In Victoria, Labor’s Steve Bracks switched from leader of the 
opposition to premier, while Denis Napthine became leader of the opposition, replacing former Liberal 
leader and premier Jeff Kennett. In Queensland, the premier remained the same, but Mike Horan 
replaced Rob Borbidge as National Party leader of the opposition. In South Australia, Rob Kerin 
replaced John Olsen as Liberal premier, while the opposition leader remained the same. In Western 
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addition made little difference to the effects of the variables of interest. At the same 
time, having so many more variables in the equation markedly increased the quantity 
of missing data which meant that some of the logit equations for states with the 
smaller subsamples could not be properly estimated, so the social structural variables 
were ultimately dropped. 
For the purposes of the multivariate analyses, the key independent variables – 
the leader popularity ratings – have been divided by 10 so that they now run from a 
low of 0 to a high of 1, which means that the unstandardised regression coefficients 
(ignoring the decimal point) can be interpreted as percentage differences in the 
likelihood of voting for the Liberal-Nationals versus the Labor Party between those at 
the top and bottom of the leader attitude scales. Rather than overwhelm the reader 
with figures that are tangential to the focus of the paper, only the coefficients for the 
party leader variables are presented in the tables within the body of the text. 
Coefficients preceded by a negative sign indicate that positive attitudes towards a 
leader coincide with a greater likelihood of voting Labor rather than Liberal-National. 
For the interested reader, an example of the full model specification is provided in 
Appendix Table 1 (which shows the equations for both state and federal elections at 
the national level).2 
The investigation begins at the national level before moving to state by state 
analyses. At the national level we consider the effects of both state and federal leaders 
in both state and federal elections. Table 2 contains the results. We might first note 
that in the nationwide sample the zero-order correlations are of considerable 
magnitude for all state and federal leaders with respect to elections at both the state 
                                                                                                                                            
Australia, Labor’s Geoff Gallop switched from opposition leader to premier, while Colin Barnett 
became opposition leader, replacing former Liberal leader and premier Richard Court. 
2 Results for the full model for each of the state by state analyses are available from the author on 
request. 
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and federal level. This pattern of sizeable zero-order associations between attitudes 
towards the party leaders and the vote is also evident in almost all cases within 
individual states in the tables that follow. At the national level, for both state and 
federal leaders the correlations are only marginally larger within the appropriate arena 
than they are in the alternative jurisdiction. In other words, the correlation between 
attitudes towards state leaders and the federal vote is not much weaker than the 
correlation between attitudes towards state leaders and the state vote, an observation 
that serves to underline the fact that in Australian politics there is a good deal of 
alignment between state and federal politics (the correlation between state and federal 
vote in the current data set is .76). Note that the correlations for the federal leaders, 
however, are larger than for the state leaders, in state as well as in federal elections. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Much more important, though, is what effects remain for political leaders after 
other factors known to have a significant influence on the vote – such as political 
attitudes and party identification – have been partialled out. Focusing initially on state 
elections, Table 2 provides results which address this question. At first we examine 
the effects of the state leaders with the federal leaders excluded from the equation. 
Both the OLS and logit results suggest that both the state premiers and opposition 
leaders have significant electoral impacts in state elections. It is more realistic, 
however, to allow for the potential impact of the federal leaders in state politics and 
thus the second part of the table shows the impact of the state leaders with the federal 
leaders included in the analysis. The effects for the state leaders are somewhat weaker 
with the federal leaders included, suggesting that state leaders do live to some extent 
in the shadow of federal politicians, but the effects of the state leaders remain clearly 
significant. The effects of the federal leaders themselves are not small by comparison 
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and, if anything, the impact of the federal leaders in the state political arena may be 
greater than that of the state leaders. Even so, when the states are viewed collectively 
as in Table 2, the hypothesis that state party leaders will influence voting in state 
elections is clearly supported. 
When we switch the focus to the federal level, we see a different pattern. The 
impact of the federal leaders is clear and strong while there is little or no impact for 
the state leaders (there is a small impact recorded for state premiers in the logit 
analysis of the two-party vote). Thus at the national level, although the crossover 
hypothesis is supported for federal leaders in state politics, it is not supported in any 
significant measure in terms of the notion that state leaders might influence federal 
election voting. It is nonetheless conceivable, that in particular states, some state 
leaders may influence the federal vote, a possibility that we explore further on. 
Returning to the state vote, Table 3 reports the results of detailed analyses 
conducted on a state by state basis. The first half of the table again excludes the 
federal party leaders from the equations, to allow us first to examine the impact of the 
state leaders in the absence of any influence their federal colleagues may bring. Under 
these conditions, in all but Western Australia, one or other of the state leaders records 
a significant effect. In New South Wales, both do, although interestingly the leader of 
the opposition, Chikarovski, has a stronger impact than the premier, Carr. Both 
Victorian leaders also have significant effects in the logit equation. The largest effect 
is for the premier of Queensland, Beattie. In South Australia, attitudes towards the 
leader of the opposition, Michael Rann, are significant whereas attitudes towards the 
premier, Kerin, are not. It is also generally worth noting that some of the coefficients 
that do not reach significance in these small state subsamples are nonetheless of a 
non-trivial size.  
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[Table 3 about here] 
As we would anticipate from the national level analysis, when attitudes 
towards the federal leaders are included in the equations in the second half of Table 3, 
the state leader effects are generally reduced. For example, once the electoral presence 
of Howard and Beazley is taken into account, Carr’s impact on state voting in New 
South Wales is reduced to insignificance in the OLS analysis. Chikarovski’s effect, 
however, remains clear and strong in both equations. The Victorian and Queensland 
premiers, Bracks and Beattie, also retain strong and significant effects even with the 
federal leaders in the equation, while opposition leader Rann’s impact in South 
Australia disappears.3 Carr’s weak impact in New South Wales, although perhaps 
surprising at first, is consistent with anecdotal evidence of Labor Party publicists 
deliberately keeping Carr’s image in the background as much as possible in the last 
state election, due to a perception that he may do more harm to the party’s cause than 
good. 
Beattie, it would appear, is not only the most popular state party leader (at 
least at the time of the 2001 AES) but also the one with the strongest electoral impact. 
The unstandardised regression coefficient for Beattie indicates that, even taking 
account of the political shadow cast by the prime minister and federal leader of the 
opposition, voters who rate Beattie most highly are some 29% more likely to vote for 
the Labor Party in Queensland (as opposed to the National or Liberal parties) than 
those who dislike Beattie most strongly. Given his high level of popularity, this means 
                                                 
3 With the results from Table 3 in mind, it is possible to reflect further on the issue of changes in 
personnel between the previous state election and the time of the survey. The results provide only 
minimal indications that changes in leadership may have influenced the level of impact of the various 
state leaders, such that those having assumed their leadership positions more recently have lesser 
effects. Similarly, if we consider the timing of each state election (the dates of which range from 1997 
in South Australia to 1999 in Victoria and New South Wales to early 2001 in Queensland and Western 
Australia) there is little if any indication of a correlation between recency and the size of the leadership 
effects. 
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that Beattie’s personal appeal confers a considerable electoral advantage upon his 
party, although, in terms of the percentage of the vote, the extent of that advantage 
may be less than many commentators would assume.  
One reasonable way of calculating that advantage is to subtract the neutral 
point on the leadership rating scale of .5 from Beattie’s mean of .63 and multiply that 
difference by the regression coefficient of -.29. This calculation suggests that Labor’s 
advantage in Queensland state politics from Beattie’s personal standing is about 3.8% 
of the vote. When contrasted with the totality of the vote, this may seem fairly small, 
but in the context of leadership effects generally, this is a considerable figure (see, for 
example, Bean and Kelley 1988, on leadership effects in the 1987 federal election). It 
is also more than twice the size of the benefit conferred by the next most popular 
leader, Bracks, who, using the same method of calculation, bestows an advantage of 
approximately 1.8% on the Labor Party vote in Victoria. Chikarovski’s effect, on the 
other hand, reduces the coalition vote in New South Wales by about the same amount. 
Having considered the impact of state leaders within their own political 
domains, Table 4 turns our attention to the first of the two crossover hypotheses, that 
state leaders may influence voting in federal elections. The results are rather mixed 
and generally tend not to support the hypothesis. Beattie’s strong effect in state 
politics, for example, disappears completely at the federal level, as does the effect for 
Chikarovski in New South Wales. Indeed, of the state party leaders only Bracks in 
Victoria records a significant effect, in the appropriate direction, on voting in the 2001 
federal election (the significant effect for the Queensland opposition leader, Horan, in 
the OLS analysis has the sign reversed from the direction the effect could be expected 
to take). In the three states with the smallest subsamples, not even the federal leader 
effects are all significantly different from zero. It is tempting to explain the Bracks 
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effect as reflecting a deliberate party strategy to capitalise on the premier’s popularity 
by giving him a prominent role in the federal election campaign in Victoria. There 
may well be something in this account, yet such a line of reasoning would have been 
expected to coincide with a similar effect on federal voting for Beattie in Queensland. 
The absence of such an effect for Beattie makes it a less convincing explanation for 
Bracks. 
[Table 4 about here] 
The final part of the analysis involves consideration of the second crossover 
hypothesis, that federal leaders may influence voting in state elections. Table 5 
presents data for the effects of federal leaders on state voting, by state (these 
coefficients are derived from the same equations that produced the effects for state 
leaders recorded in the bottom half of Table 3). While the picture at the national level, 
as shown in Table 2, indicated a clear effect for the federal leaders on state politics, 
this picture is not fully reinforced when the data are examined on a state by state 
basis. Howard records a significant impact in all states in the OLS equations and in 
three of the five in the logit analyses (the exceptions being South Australia and 
Western Australia). Attitudes to Beazley, however, are significant only in New South 
Wales and Queensland (in the logit equation). A joint inspection of Table 5 and the 
bottom half of Table 3 suggests that in some states – Victoria and Queensland – either 
the federal or state leader of each party has an impact, but not both. The evidence for 
a federal leader crossover effect would appear to be stronger than for a state leader 
crossover effect, but the results of the analysis depict federal effects at the state level 
that are certainly less than universal. The evidence before us also suggests that the 
prime minister may exert a stronger influence on state politics than the leader of the 
federal opposition. 
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[Table 5 about here] 
Conclusion 
There are a number of reasons why this paper must be seen less as a definitive 
account and more as a tentative first step in the analysis of the electoral effects of state 
party leaders. As emphasised throughout the analysis, the sizes of the subsamples 
from several of the states are smaller than desirable and as a result it is only the two or 
three most populous states whose results we can be reasonably confident about. The 
occasional aberrant results thrown up by the statistical analysis reinforce this caveat. 
Furthermore, the measurement of key variables would ideally be further refined, with 
questions asked about specific leaders in each state by name, rather than with a 
generic label, and with a more direct alignment between the leadership rating items 
and the voting questions in terms of timing. 
 Nonetheless, the findings point to clear evidence of state political party leaders 
having an electoral influence at the state level. In particular, prominent premiers, such 
as Peter Beattie in Queensland and Steve Bracks in Victoria, have significant and 
substantial effects on voting in state elections, even when the influence of the leaders 
of the major federal political parties is controlled for. So too does the leader of the 
opposition in New South Wales, Kerry Chikarovski, although the premier in that 
state, Bob Carr, is overshadowed in terms of electoral impact by the federal leaders as 
well as by Chikarovski. In other states, like South Australia and Western Australia, 
there is less evidence of leadership effects, but the smaller subsample sizes for these 
states make it difficult to reach definitive conclusions.  
Examined closely, the results provide mixed support for the three hypotheses 
outlined at the beginning of the paper, namely that state party leaders influence voting 
in state elections, that state party leaders influence voting in federal elections and that 
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federal leaders influence voting in state elections. For the first hypothesis, as the 
discussion in the paragraph above indicates, the effects are not as consistent across all 
leaders in all states as perhaps may have been anticipated. It is, however, quite 
conceivable that more adequate sample sizes would reveal significant leader effects in 
all states. With respect to the second and third hypotheses, although the argument 
about crossover effects in Australian politics is commonly framed in terms of state 
effects on federal politics, it manifests itself more strongly and more coherently in 
federal effects on state politics, although the results as they stand do not provide 
universal support for the notion of consistent crossover effects in either arena. 
Finally, it is worth reflecting on the relative size of such leadership effects as 
we have identified. As we have come to expect from research on the influence of 
leadership in federal elections, even where the effects are statistically significant the 
electoral impact of leaders is always relatively modest, net of other influences. 
Compared to a factor like party identification, leadership images and the responses 
they provoke among voters add to the explanation of electoral behaviour more at the 
margins than at the core. The example given in the paper of the overall effect of a 
popular and highly salient leader like Peter Beattie illustrates this point well. And 
while it may be a surprise to some that Beattie is worth less than 4% of the vote to his 
party, the value of this effect is seen in perspective when we consider how elections 
can be won and lost at the margins. In a political system where large party effects 
frequently cancel each other out and elections are often very closely fought, 
leadership effects, while modest in absolute size, can and on occasion do come into 
their own as the difference between winning and losing.  
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Equally crucial is the potential for leadership to convert a comfortable victory 
into a landslide.4 For example, in the Queensland state election of 2001, the total 
increase in the Labor Party vote was just over 10%, giving the Party more than 20 
additional seats. In that context, Beattie’s contribution of 4%, while not pivotal, 
certainly added a very rich layer of icing to the cake. The effect of the leader in this 
instance may therefore have been to provide his party with the chance for long term 
domination in state politics. Bracks may possibly have had a similar impact in the 
most recent Victorian election in late 2002. In a similar vein, analysis of electoral 
politics in the Hawke era (Bean and Kelley 1988) showed how Bob Hawke’s 
popularity with the electorate helped solidify the Australian Labor Party’s position in 
federal politics during the 1980s not only by enhancing the Labor vote at particular 
elections but also by gradually increasing the ongoing level of voter identification 
with the Labor Party. 
In terms of the paper’s wider contribution to the field of electoral studies, the 
findings from this analysis add to the corpus of evidence on the influence of political 
party leaders on voting behaviour by providing confirmation of leader effects at the 
subnational level within a parliamentary political system. This is further evidence that 
the personal styles and characteristics of the individuals who lead political parties are 
electorally important irrespective of the political arena in which these leaders are 
vying for power.  
 
Appendix 
[Appendix Table 1 here] 
                                                 
4 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for the Australian Journal of Political Science for suggesting 
the addition of a discussion of this aspect of leadership influence. 
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Table 1: Popularity of State and Federal Party Leaders  
(means on 0-10 scale) 
 
 
 MEAN 
POPULARITY 
RATING 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
Nationwidea (n=1779) 
 
State premiers 
State opposition leaders 
 Prime minister (John Howard, Liberal) 
 Federal opposition leader (Kim Beazley, Labor) 
 
New South Wales (n=666) 
 
 Premier (Bob Carr, Labor) 
 Opposition leader (Kerry Chikarovski, Liberal) 
 
Victoria (n=497) 
Premier (Steve Bracks, Labor) 
Opposition leader (Denis Napthine, Liberal) 
 
Queensland (n=358) 
 
 Premier (Peter Beattie, Labor) 
Opposition leader (Mike Horan, National) 
 
South Australia (n=171) 
 
Premier (Rob Kerin, Liberal) 
Opposition leader (Michael Rann, Labor) 
 
Western Australia (n=199) 
 
Premier (Geoff Gallop, Labor) 
Opposition leader (Colin Barnett, Liberal) 
  
 
 
5.6 
4.2 
5.6 
5.8 
 
 
 
5.1 
4.2 
 
 
 
5.9 
4.0 
 
 
 
6.3 
4.5 
 
 
 
5.0 
4.0 
 
 
 
5.2 
4.2 
 
 
2.7 
2.2 
3.2 
2.8 
 
 
 
2.7 
2.1 
 
 
 
2.8 
2.2 
 
 
 
2.7 
2.2 
 
 
 
2.7 
2.5 
 
 
 
2.4 
2.3 
 
a Includes all states with a Labor government at the time of the survey, that is New 
South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania.   
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2001 (n=2010). 
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 Table 2: Effects of State and Federal Leaders on Voting in State and Federal Elections: 
Results at the National Levela 
 
 
 ZERO-ORDER 
CORRELATION 
UNSTANDARDISED 
OLS COEFFICIENT 
STANDARDISED 
OLS 
COEFFICIENT 
LOGIT 
COEFFICIENT 
State Elections 
(Federal leaders excluded): 
Premier 
State opposition leader 
 
(Federal leaders included): 
 Premier 
 State opposition leader 
 Prime Minister 
 Federal opposition leader 
 
Federal Elections 
 Premier 
 State opposition leader 
 Prime minister 
 Federal opposition leader 
 
 
 
-.40 
 .29 
 
 
-.40 
 .29 
 .59 
-.47 
 
 
-.37 
 .26 
 .64 
-.52 
 
 
 
   -.22** 
    .15** 
 
 
   -.18** 
    .11** 
    .19** 
   -.14** 
 
 
 -.05    
 -.04   
      .29** 
     -.23** 
 
 
 
-.13 
 .07 
 
 
-.10 
 .05 
 .13 
-.09 
 
 
-.03 
-.02 
 .21 
-.14 
 
 
   -2.62** 
    2.03** 
 
 
   -2.67** 
    1.76** 
    2.36** 
   -1.66** 
 
 
 -1.41* 
-1.13 
     5.56** 
   -3.76** 
 
a Results are for the five states with Labor governments listed in the footnote to Table 
1. OLS and logistic regression equations control for political attitudes and party 
identification.  See text for further details. 
 
* p < .05;  ** p <.01 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2001 (n=2010). 
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Table 3: Effects of State Leaders on Voting in State Electionsa 
 
 
 ZERO-ORDER 
CORRELATION 
UNSTANDARDISED 
OLS COEFFICIENT 
STANDARDISED 
OLS 
COEFFICIENT 
LOGIT 
COEFFICIENT 
(Federal leaders excluded): 
New South Wales 
 Bob Carr 
 Kerry Chikarovski 
 
Victoria 
Steve Bracks 
Denis Napthine 
 
Queensland 
Peter Beattie 
Mike Horan 
 
South Australia 
 Rob Kerin 
 Michael Rann 
 
Western Australia 
 Geoff Gallup 
 Colin Barnett 
 
(Federal leaders included): 
New South Wales 
 Bob Carr 
 Kerry Chikarovski 
 
Victoria 
 Steve Bracks 
 Denis Napthine 
 
Queensland 
 Peter Beattie 
 Mike Horan 
 
South Australia 
 Rob Kerin 
 Michael Rann 
 
Western Australia 
 Geoff Gallup 
 Colin Barnett 
 
 
 
-.31 
 .27 
 
 
-.45 
 .38 
 
 
-.51 
 .30 
 
 
 .44 
-.51 
 
 
-.30 
 .13 
 
 
 
-.31 
 .27 
 
 
-.45 
 .38 
 
 
-.51 
 .30 
 
 
 .44 
-.51 
 
 
-.30 
 .13 
 
 
 
     -.14** 
      .24** 
 
 
      -.23** 
   .14   
 
 
     -.32** 
   .06 
 
 
  -.04   
   -.19* 
 
 
  -.16 
    .05 
 
 
 
  -.09 
        .23** 
 
 
     -.20** 
   .06 
 
 
     -.29** 
 -.06 
 
 
   -.09 
   -.14 
 
 
   -.14 
    .02 
 
 
 
    -.08 
     .11 
 
 
   -.13 
     .07 
 
 
   -.19 
     .03 
 
 
   -.03 
   -.10 
 
 
   -.08 
    .02 
 
 
 
   -.04 
    .10 
 
 
   -.12 
     .03 
 
 
   -.17 
   -.00 
 
 
   -.05 
   -.08 
 
 
   -.07 
    .01 
 
 
 
  -2.24** 
    3.47** 
 
 
   -2.39** 
   2.61* 
 
 
   -5.08** 
  .51 
 
 
 .95 
-5.05* 
 
 
-1.23 
  -.35 
 
 
 
    -2.21** 
      3.72** 
 
 
     -2.58** 
   1.82 
 
 
    -5.51** 
  -.53 
 
 
  -.83 
-5.00 
 
 
 -2.04 
   -.37 
 
 
a OLS and logistic regression equations control for political attitudes and party 
identification.  See text for further details. 
 
* p < .05;  ** p <.01 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2001 (n=2010). 
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Table 4: Effects of State and Federal Leaders on Voting in Federal Elections 
within Statesa 
 
 
 ZERO-ORDER 
CORRELATION 
UNSTANDARDISED 
OLS COEFFICIENT 
STANDARDISED 
OLS 
COEFFICIENT 
LOGIT 
COEFFICIENT 
New South Wales 
Bob Carr 
Kerry Chikarovski 
John Howard 
Kim Beazley 
 
Victoria 
Steve Bracks 
Denis Napthine 
John Howard 
Kim Beazley 
 
Queensland 
Peter Beattie 
Mike Horan 
John Howard 
Kim Beazley 
 
South Australia 
Rob Kerin 
Michael Rann 
John Howard 
Kim Beazley 
 
Western Australia 
Geoff Gallup 
Colin Barnett 
John Howard 
Kim Beazley 
 
 
-.30 
  .21 
 .64 
-.50 
 
 
-.47 
 .34 
 .66 
-.55 
 
 
-.41 
 .33 
 .70 
-.51 
 
 
 .43 
-.45 
 .76 
-.50 
 
 
-.29 
 .09 
 .54 
-.48 
 
 
   -.01  
    .02 
        .25** 
       -.24** 
 
 
     -.16** 
 -.08 
       .34** 
     -.22** 
 
 
-.00 
  -.13* 
      .38** 
  -.14* 
 
 
 -.16 
 -.00 
       .37** 
 -.09 
 
 
-.03 
-.03 
 .16 
  -.21* 
 
 
 
-.01 
  .01 
  .18 
-.15 
 
 
-.09 
-.04 
  .24 
-.13 
 
 
 -.00 
-.06 
  .27 
-.09 
 
 
-.10 
  .00 
  .28 
-.06 
 
 
-.02 
-.01 
  .11 
-.13 
 
-.61 
  .07 
     4.11** 
    -3.92** 
 
 
    -3.95** 
-1.47 
      8.88** 
  -3.69* 
 
 
-1.32 
-4.40 
   -10.50** 
-3.50 
 
 
-.66 
 .36 
 9.56* 
-7.55* 
 
 
-1.69 
-3.98 
    4.13* 
  -3.36* 
 
a OLS and logistic regression equations control for political attitudes and party 
identification.  See text for further details. 
 
* p < .05;  ** p <.01 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2001 (n=2010). 
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Table 5: Effects of Federal Leaders on Voting in State Electionsa 
 
 
 ZERO-ORDER 
CORRELATION 
UNSTANDARDISED 
OLS COEFFICIENT 
STANDARDISED 
OLS 
COEFFICIENT 
LOGIT 
COEFFICIENT 
New South Wales 
John Howard 
Kim Beazley 
 
Victoria 
John Howard  
Kim Beazley 
 
Queensland 
John Howard  
Kim Beazley 
 
South Australia 
John Howard  
Kim Beazley 
 
Western Australia 
John Howard  
Kim Beazley 
 
 
 
  .58 
-.47 
 
 
  .62 
-.47 
 
 
  .56 
-.50 
 
 
  .72 
-.52 
 
 
  .57 
-.44 
 
 
    .16** 
   -.23** 
 
 
      .21** 
-.06 
 
 
    .18* 
-.09 
 
 
    .20* 
-.10 
 
 
      .30** 
-.13 
 
  .11 
-.14 
 
 
 .14 
-.03 
 
 
  .12 
-.06 
 
 
  .14 
-.07 
 
 
 .19 
-.08 
 
  1.96** 
-2.68** 
 
 
   3.16** 
-.08 
 
 
  3.48* 
  -3.14** 
 
 
  4.15 
-1.31 
 
 
 2.65 
 -.62 
 
a OLS and logistic regression equations control for political attitudes and party 
identification.  See text for further details. 
 
* p < .05;  ** p <.01 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2001 (n=2010). 
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Appendix Table 1: Full Model Specification for Multivariate Equations at the  
National Levela  
 
 
 ZERO-ORDER 
CORRELATION 
UNSTANDARDISED 
OLS COEFFICIENT 
STANDARDISED 
OLS 
COEFFICIENT 
LOGIT 
COEFFICIENT 
State Elections 
 Premier 
 State opposition leader 
 Prime Minister 
 Federal opposition leader 
 Attitudes to trade unions 
 Attitudes to free enterprise 
 Party identification 
 Constant 
 
 R2 
 
Federal Elections 
 Premier 
 State opposition leader 
 Prime minister 
 Federal opposition leader 
 Attitudes to trade unions 
 Attitudes to free enterprise 
 Party identification 
 Constant 
 
 R2 
 
 
-.40 
 .29 
 .59 
-.47 
 .44 
 .24 
 .77 
 
 
 
 
 
-.37 
 .26 
 .64 
-.52 
 .44 
 .26 
 .82 
 
   -.18** 
    .11** 
    .19** 
   -.14** 
   .09* 
 .02 
     .61** 
     .14** 
 
  .64 
 
  
 -.05    
 -.04   
      .29** 
     -.23** 
   .03 
   .03 
      .63** 
      .20** 
 
  .72 
 
-.10 
 .05 
 .13 
-.09 
 .05 
 .01 
 .57 
 
 
 
 
 
-.03 
-.02 
 .21 
-.14 
 .02 
 .02 
 .60 
 
   -2.67** 
    1.76** 
    2.36** 
   -1.66** 
   .85 
   .65 
     3.36** 
    -2.28** 
 
  
 
 
 -1.41* 
-1.13 
     5.56** 
    -3.76** 
 1.23 
   .48 
     4.29** 
    -2.49** 
 
a Results are for the five states with Labor governments listed in the footnote to Table 
1.  
 
* p < .05;  ** p <.01 
 
Source: Australian Election Study, 2001 (n=2010). 
 
 
